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ABSTRACT
The recent implementation of the Gender Recognition Act marks a
dramatic change in the regulation of transsexualism in the United
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its progeny have sought to contain the troubling effects that recognition of
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transsexual and intersexual embodiment might have for prevailing gender
norms. The article proposes a novel re-reading of Corbett in the context of
a little noted line of cases involving intersex spouses. Contrasting
responses to the spouses in these cases suggests that courts have been
unsympathetic to transsexuals who make manifest their agency in choosing
gender transition, while demonstrating sympathy to those whose transition
is made necessary by ambiguity or a medical mistake regarding their true
sex. She cautions that the new recognition regime continues this strategy of
containment by delegating the power to identify the true sex of transsexual
and intersex individuals to medico-legal experts rather than allowing
transsexual individuals autonomy to choose their gender identity.
INTRODUCTION: “MARRIAGE IS A RELATIONSHIP WHICH DEPENDS ON SEX,
2
AND NOT ON GENDER.”
The last three decades have seen dramatic changes in the legal regulation
of transsexuality in the United Kingdom.3 A central theme in this history
has been the deployment of the disciplines of medicine and biology to
explain and contain the disconcerting facts of transsexual embodiment.
Judges and legislators have sought to identify the true nature of
transsexualism. The hidden sexual identity of the transsexual has been
variously located: first in the immutable facts of transsexuals’ birth
morphology, then in diagnoses of their psychiatric pathology, and, more
recently, in emerging evidence regarding gender-differentiated structures
within the brain. Invariably, however, English law’s approach to regulating
the rights and duties of transsexuals has been founded on inferences
regarding the meaning of scientific evidence rather than on the normative
justifications for linking legal entitlements, such as marriage to sex and
gender.
This article will argue that the history of English marriage law is one in
which the most provocative anxieties raised by transsexual spouses have
been consciously silenced. It will propose an alternative reading of the
classic case of Corbett v. Corbett, setting the decision in the context of a
little noted line of marriage cases that appear to have involved intersex
spouses. It posits that the relationship between these cases should be
understood through the lens of Judith Butler’s notion of gender

2. Corbett v. Corbett, [1971] P. 83, 107.
3. See HOME OFFICE, REPORT OF THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL WORKING GROUP ON
TRANSSEXUAL PEOPLE, 2000, at 3 [hereinafter HOME OFFICE REPORT] (estimating that the
prevalence of transsexualism, those who suffer from gender dysmorphic disorder, falls
between one in 12-17,000 men and one in 60-85,000 women). Between 1997 and 1999,
forty-eight sex reassignment surgeries were performed in the United Kingdom, forty-four of
which involved males transitioning to females. Id.
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“performativity.”4 The notion of gender identity as a form of performance
allows the unpacking of the trope of “pastiche,” which the Corbett court
uses to characterize the transsexual plaintiff.5 The article argues that the
reliance upon apparently immutable biological facts in Corbett and its
progeny aims to quiet certain troubling anxieties about gender that are
provoked by the specter of the transsexual, but rather demonstrates that
resort to neutral science does not allow an escape from the fraught politics
of gender. The article then revisits the intersex exception set out in Corbett
and considers how it was utilized in the recent marriage cases of W. v. W.6
and Bellinger v. Bellinger7 to allow a subcategory of transsexuals to correct
their birth registration, while leaving the heterosexual conception of
marriage intact. It concludes that while the Gender Recognition Act
permits gender transition, it conceptualizes transsexuality and
intersexuality as pathological and repudiates the performative nature of
gender.
I. THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE INTERSEX SPOUSE
Marriage is defined under English common law as “a union for life of
one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others.”8 The case from
which this definition derives, Hyde v. Hyde, considered the validity of a
polygamous marriage transacted by Mormons in the pre-Union American
territory of Utah.9 The case determined that only monogamous marriages
could be recognized as valid in English courts.10 The conclusion was thus
that English marriage involved only one man and one woman. The case
did not consider whether marriage required the presence of one man and
one woman.
The issue of whether a marriage must be comprised of one man and one
woman first emerged in the Court of Appeal in 1970.11 The case arose in
4. See generally JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM

OF IDENTITY (1990).

AND THE

SUBVERSION

5. Corbett v. Corbett, [1971] P. 83.
6. [2001] Fam. 111.
7. [2001] EWCA Civ. 1140.
8. Hyde v. Hyde, (1866) 1 L.R.P. & D. 130.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female: Intersexuality and the Collision
between Law and Biology, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 265, 277 (1999) (stating that medieval Jewish
law makes reference to the existence of hermaphrodites and specifies how they are to
negotiate sex-segregated rights and duties, including marriage); see also ANNE FAUSTOSTERLING, SEXING THE BODY: GENDER POLITICS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUALITY 3335 (2000) (explaining that seventeenth century French law regulated the appropriate genderlinked attire that could be worn by intersexuals); STEPHEN WHITTLE, RESPECT AND
EQUALITY: TRANSSEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 21-26 (2002) (suggesting that many
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response to an application for maintenance made by April Ashley against
her estranged husband, Arthur Corbett, Lord Rowallan.12 Lord Rowallan
launched a countersuit arguing that he was not liable for spousal
maintenance because no valid marriage had been created.13 He claimed the
marriage was invalid because both parties to it were male.14 The Corbett
case thus raised two questions of first impression: Was the sex of the
spouses essential to the validity of a marriage, and, if so, how was the sex
of an individual to be determined?15
April Ashley had been registered as male at birth and raised as a male
under the name of George Jamieson.16 The court found that from late
adolescence George had felt that he was really a woman.17 He had adopted
a female persona in dress and deportment, had used hormones to feminize
his appearance, and had ultimately undergone a surgical mastectomy,
castration, and vaginoplasty.18 It was in this embodiment that George, now
renamed April, met, courted, and married Lord Rowallan, while working as
historical accounts of the regulation of cross-dressing may have involved transgender
people). In the absence of any form of medical intervention, adopting the attire and manner
of the other sex was the only available form of gender transition. Id. See generally
EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTION OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1st Am. ed.
1812) (demonstrating that questions regarding the legal sex of intersexuals had emerged in
other legal contexts). Lord Coke suggested that questions regarding the eligibility of
hermaphrodites to inherit male titles and wealth should be decided in accordance with “the
sexe which prevaileth.” Id.
12. Corbett v. Corbett, [1971] P. 83.
13. Id.
14. It is not a coincidence that a number of the cases about the recognition of
transsexual identities have emerged in the context of the termination of a marriage because
of death or marital breakdown. See, e.g., W. v. W., (2001) Fam. 111 (noting that the
repudiation of transsexual identity was used as a strategy to escape paying maintenance to a
spouse on divorce); In re Ladrach, 32 Ohio Misc. 2d 6, 10 (1987) (adopting the reasoning of
Corbett that birth sex is immutable “true sex”); M.T. v. J.T., 335 A.2d 204, 209 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1976) (rejecting the Corbett test and finding that a post-operative transsexual
capable of vaginal intercourse is a woman for the purpose of marriage); Anonymous v.
Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499, 500 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971) (finding that a marriage
ceremony involving a pre-transition transsexual woman did not create a marriage contract).
The repudiation of transsexual identity also has been used to avoid potential liability for
wrongful death of a spouse due to medical negligence. See Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d
223, 227 (Tex. App. 1999) (stating that Corbett concludes that the biological sexual
structure of an individual is fixed at birth and cannot be changed by surgery). It also has
been used to attempt to exclude a spouse from inheriting the estate of a deceased spouse.
See In re Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120, 130 (Kan. 2002) (denying the transsexual wife’s claim to
inherit under rules of intestacy because the marriage was viewed as same sex and invalid;
instead, the estate was awarded to the deceased son who had contested the wife’s claim).
The Supreme Court of Kansas commented, “[h]er female anatomy, however, is still all manmade. The body J’Noel inhabits is a male body in all aspects other than what the physicians
have supplied.” Id.
15. Corbett, P. 83 at 83.
16. Id. at 89.
17. Id. at 90.
18. Id.
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a female impersonator.19
Writing for the Court of Appeal, Justice Ormrod identified three roles
that the sex of the parties might play in legal relations.20 The broadest
category is where sex has no relevance to the validity of the legal
relationship, such as most aspects of contract and tort.21 The second,
smaller category consists of those relations in which sex is a relevant
factor, such as an insurance policy that requires different premium amounts
depending upon the sex of the insured or a pension plan that has different
entitlement ages depending on the sex of the pensioner.22 In these
situations, the parties to the contract have chosen to make sex a relevant
factor but would be free to vary the contract to exclude the relevance of
sex, while retaining a valid legal relationship.23 The third, extremely
narrow category includes those legal relations in which sex is an essential
element, such as criminal prohibitions that define rape as vaginal
penetration with a penis and require that the victim be female and the
perpetrator be male.24
In which category does marriage fit? Judge Ormrod noted that a central
element of a valid marriage has been held to be the capacity of the parties
to consummate the marriage.25 The definition of consummation as
“ordinary and complete” heterosexual intercourse derives from the
nineteenth century case of D-e v. A-g.26 The case was decided twelve years
before divorce became possible under English law, except through the
extraordinary measure of a specific act of Parliament.27 This case reflects
both a quaint prudishness regarding the diversity of sexual practices and,
perhaps, a benevolent impulse to find a basis for ending an unhappy
marriage that could not otherwise be terminated. The wife, suffering from
a physical abnormality that might now be diagnosed as an intersex

19. Id. at 91.
20. Id. at 105-06.
21. Id. at 105.
22. Id. at 105.
23. Id. at 105
24. Id. at 106 (articulating that offenses such as adultery, rape, and gross indecency, by
definition, require a particular sex to have perpetrated it). See generally Sexual Offenses
Act, 2003, c. 42 (U.K.) (enunciating that English law continues to define rape as an offense
that can only be committed by a man, but it can now be applied to assaults perpetrated
against men or women). Rape is defined as intentional penetration of the vagina, anus, or
mouth of another person with a penis. Id. Women and men can, however, now be
prosecuted for the offense of assault by penetration, which entails intentional penetration of
the vagina or anus of another with a part of the body or anything else. Id.
25. Corbett, P. 83 at 83.
26. (1845) 1 Rob. Ecc. 279.
27. See Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857 (U.K.) (allowing divorce to be
more broadly available).
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condition, was unable to engage in vaginal intercourse.28 The court
determined that this incapacity rendered her unable to participate in the
fulfillment of the two principal ends of matrimony, namely “the lawful
indulgence of the passions” and procreation.29 In his reasoning, Dr.
Lushington rejected the notion that other forms of intimacy could constitute
consummation:
[L]egally speaking, [other practices are] not intercourse at all. I can
never think that the true interests of society would be advanced by
retaining within the marriage bonds parties driven to such disgusting
practices. Certainly it would not tend to the prevention of adulterous
intercourse, one the greatest evils to be avoided.30

It was in reliance on this Victorian account of marriage that Judge
Ormrod determined that marriage is an institution in which it is essential
that the parties be of opposite sexes. While companionship and mutual
support are important aspects of marriage, he held that it is only the
capacity for “natural heterosexual intercourse” that distinguishes marriage
from other relationships.31 The sexual encounters between Mr. and Mrs.
Corbett could not have constituted consummation understood in this way.
Their intimacies were, Judge Ormrod held, “the reverse of ordinary and in
no sense natural.”32 Indeed, he hints that they were just the sort of
“disgusting practices” that marital intimacies were meant to supplant.33
Having determined that sex is an essential element of marital validity,
Judge Ormrod considered how the sex of an individual ought to be
determined for purposes of marriage. He stated that for most purposes,
where sex is legally irrelevant it can be determined on the basis of social
gender, or how one identifies and comports oneself.34 Because marriage is
an institution that depends on the physical capacity to engage in
heterosexual intercourse, however, sexual identity for purposes of marriage

28. See D-e, 1 Rob. Ecc. at 280-81.
29. Id. at 298.
30. Id.
31. Corbett v. Corbett, [1971] P. 83, 105. See generally SANDER GILMAN, MAKING THE
BODY BEAUTIFUL: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF AESTHETIC SURGERY (1999) (demonstrating the
medical conception of sexual identity as rooted in the capacity for intercourse rather than
reproduction). Gender transition may involve the transformation of genitalia and secondary
sex characteristics but generally does not involve the construction of the reproductive organs
of the new sex. Id. This view may also be shared by some transsexuals who desire to alter
their sexual organs but not to acquire the reproductive apparatus related to their new sex. Id.
32. Corbett, P. 83 at 107.
33. See generally Andrew Sharpe, Transgender Jurisprudence and the Spectre of
Homosexuality, 14 AUSTL. FEMINIST L.J. 23 (2000) (discussing the role of homosexuality in
transsexual marriage cases).
34. Corbett, P. 83 at 104.
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must be determined in accordance with biological factors.35 A medical
doctor by training, Judge Ormrod reviewed medical evidence current in
1970 on the issue and identified at least five criteria which could be used to
assess the sexual condition of an individual:
(1) Chromosome distribution: Does the individual have xx
(female), xy (male), or an atypical chromosomal endowment such
as xxy or xo (abnormal combinations)?36
(2) Gonadal structures: Does the individual have testes (male),
ovaries (female), or some mix of gonadal structures (true
hermaphrodite)?37
(3) Genital configurations: Does the individual have a
uterus/vagina or penis/scrotum which have developed within
normal parameters? Are these structures absent or have they
developed atypically due to some chemical imbalance in utero?38
(4) Psychological factors: Does the individual see himself as a
man or a woman?39
(5) Hormonal factors/secondary sex characteristics: Does the
individual possess levels of sex-linked hormones appropriate to
one sex or the other? Do the body mass, fat distribution, breast
development, and hair growth follow a male or a female type?40
Considered in her post-surgery embodiment, April Ashley appeared to
meet more criteria for a female gender assignment than for a male one, or
at least to be appropriately characterized as of indeterminate sex. Her
genitalia were female in appearance, her hormone level and physique were
that of a woman, and she identified as a woman.41 Conversely, her
35. Id. at 106-07.
36. Id., at 100-01.
37. Id.
38. Her symptoms might be consistent with a number of conditions. For example,
complete androgen insensitivity syndrome (AIS) would mean that her genitals did not fully
masculinize during gestation. At puberty, both estrogen and testosterone are released from
the testes but because the body cannot respond to testosterone, the estrogen feminizes the
body so that it appears outwardly female and those afflicted generally develop female
gender identities. For an account of the syndrome and its effects, see SUZANNE J.
KESSLER AND WENDY McKENNA, GENDER: AN ETHNOMETHODOLOGICAL
APPROACH 49-50 (1978). For a detailed account of the range of disorders which give rise
to inter-sex conditions, see Greenberg, supra note 11, at 265.
39. Corbett, P.83 at 90.
40. Id. at 100.
41. Id. at 104.
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chromosomes continued to identify her as male, while her gonads offered
no guidance, having been excised. Justice Ormrod stated that the
determination of sex should not be based on the state of the spouse’s body
at the time of trial or the time of the wedding ceremony, however, but as it
was at birth.42 The alternative approach, he cautioned, would recognize
post-operative transsexuals in their new identities, a result he characterized
as “nothing if not bizarre.”43
Justice Ormrod did accept, in obiter, that there was a medically
recognized category of people who are “intersex” because of some organic
abnormality.44 Such conditions may create a state of incongruity between
their chromosomes and other physical attributes or may cause atypical
chromosomal endowments that do not track typical male or female
morphology. These people, Ormrod suggested, may have no obvious
location in the binary gender scheme, so their gender assignment may have
to be reevaluated if developments in adolescence or adulthood suggest that
the initial assignment was inappropriate.45 The court heard expert evidence
that April Ashley was in fact suffering from an intersex condition named
Klinefelter’s syndrome, in which an XY male appears normal at birth but
develops a feminized appearance at puberty.46 This contention was
rejected as either unsupported by available evidence or explained by Mrs.
Corbett’s long term use of synthetic female hormones.47
The court found that, for most individuals, determinations of sex for
purposes of marriage should be determined with reference to chromosomal,
gonadal, and genital factors present at birth and should ignore surgical and
synthetic hormonal alterations.48 Where these three former factors are not
42. This approach has been adopted in other areas of law. See, e.g., R. v. Tan, [1983]
Q.B. 1053 (finding that the Corbett test used to determine legal sex for purposes of
prosecution for being a male living off the avails of prostitution runs contrary to § 30 of the
Sexual Offences Act, 2003 c. 42); Re P. and G, (1996) 2 Fam. 90 (using the Corbett test to
determine sex for registration on birth certificates). But see A v. Chief Constable of West
Yorkshire Police and Another, [2004] UKHL 21, 29 (affirming that the prohibition of
discrimination based on transsexual status and reading Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 35 Eur.
Ct. H.R. 447 (2002), to prospectively require legal recognition of gender re-assignment in
employment discrimination context).
43. Corbett, P. 83 at 106.
44. Id. at 102.
45. Id. at 104 (concluding that biological sex is fixed at birth, if not earlier, and cannot
be changed, either by the natural development of organs of the opposite sex or by medical or
surgical means). The respondent’s operation, therefore, cannot affect her true sex. Id. The
only cases where the term “change of sex” is appropriate are those in which a mistake as to
sex is made at birth and subsequently revealed by further medical investigation. Id.
46. Id. at 102.
47. Id. at 102-03.
48. Id. at 100 (elaborating that these criteria have been formed by doctors for the
specific purpose of systematizing medical knowledge and assisting in deciding the best way
to handle patients with sexual abnormalities).
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congruent, such as in the case of intersex individuals, the court suggested,
again in obiter, that greater weight should probably be given to genital
criteria over the other two factors.49
The Corbett court thus found that Mrs. Corbett had not changed her
sex.50 She was born male and she remained male. As a male, she was
clearly not “naturally capable of performing the role of a woman in
marriage.”51 She had merely created “a pastiche of femininity.”52 Her
transsexualism was an extended form of the sort of drag performance she
delivered in her professional life:
Her outward appearance at first sight was convincingly feminine, but on
closer and longer examination in the witness box it was much less so.
The voice, manner, gestures and attitudes became increasingly
reminiscent of the accomplished female impersonator.53

The court therefore found the marriage void, and Mrs. Corbett was denied
both status and maintenance.54
This interpretation of the marital
relationship is now codified in Section 11(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act
of 1973, which states that a marriage is void ab initio if the parties are not
respectively male and female.55
II. PASTICHE AND THE CONTAINMENT OF GENDER TROUBLE
Estimates of the frequency of intersex conditions vary depending upon
the criteria used. One expert suggests that 1.7% of births differ from the
norm in some way.56 Another is persuaded that doctors are unsure of the
sex of one in 1,500 babies.57 Yet, an intersex party does not appear in the
49. Id. at 102.
50. Id. at 104.
51. Id. at 106.
52. Id. at 104.
53. Id.
54. The husband had asked the judge to withhold a decree of nullity, thereby subverting
the wife’s application for ancillary relief, but the court found it had no authority to withhold
such a decree, even where the void marriage was sham and meretricious. The wife was later
denied support on the basis of lack of need. Id. This approach was affirmed in S.-T. v. J.,
(1997) Fam. 103.
55. Under English law prior to 2005, transsexuals were permitted to change identifying
documents that refer to their gender role upon producing proof from a medical practitioner
that they were living in the gender role of the opposite sex. This meant that they could alter
their driving licenses, passports, car registrations, National Insurance cards, and National
Health cards to reflect this new gender role. However, while all these might be proof of
identity, they refer to elements of identity that do not themselves depend upon sex. Birth
certificates, which provide an account of legal status rather than personal identity, could not
be altered to reflect a transsexual’s chosen sex, even after complete sex reassignment
surgery.
56. See FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 11, at 51.
57. See Alice Domurat-Dreger, ‘Ambiguous Sex’or Ambivalent Medicine? Ethical
Issues in the Treatment of Intersexuality, 28 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 24 n.6 (1998).
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case law on marital validity until 2001 in W. v. W.58 It is hard to imagine
that intersex conditions did not create marital conflicts prior to this point.
So where are the intersex spouses? Hints of their presence may be found in
the cases defining the nature of the capacity and incapacity to consummate
marriage.
In coming to his conclusion, Justice Ormrod distinguished Mrs.
Corbett’s situation from that of other individuals who require surgery in
order to participate in heterosexual intercourse. In particular, he considered
and distinguished the decision of the Court of Appeal in S.Y. v. S.Y.
rendered only seven years earlier.59 Until the Corbett decision, he noted,
all matrimonial cases arising out of developmental abnormalities of the
reproductive system had been dealt with as cases in which the marriage
was void because one party lacked the capacity to consummate the
marriage. The question of the true sex of the allegedly incapable spouse,
such as the wife in D-e v. A-g,60 did not arise. The context of the Corbett
case appears rather different if we consider the possibility that it was one of
a small series of cases involving spouses of indeterminate sex.
S.Y. involved an application by a husband for a decree of nullity based
on his wife’s physical incapacity to consummate because her vagina was
too short to allow her to participate in penetrative intercourse.61 It was
assumed that the wife in S.Y. was chromosomally and gonadally female but
imperfect genitally, but this is not the only interpretation supported by the
evidence.62 Her history might be that of an individual with an intersex
condition. She appeared female at birth and was raised as a girl. At the
age of seventeen, she underwent a medical examination to determine why
she had never menstruated. At that time, it was discovered that she did not
have a uterus or ovaries and had a very short vagina.63 While medical
experts speculated that she might have had undetectable vestigial female
reproductive organs, no evidence to this effect was introduced. No
evidence was introduced of her chromosomal makeup either. The wife was
assumed to be a woman because her external genitalia, although
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

(2001) Fam. 111.
(1962) P. 37.
(1845) 1 Rob. Ecc. 279.
S.Y., P. 37 at 37.
See SUZANNE KESSLER & WENDY MCKENNA, GENDER: AN ETHNOMETHODOLOGICAL
APPROACH 49-50 (1978) (explaining that a person with complete androgen insensitivity
syndrome (AIS) has genitals that did not fully masculinize during gestation). At puberty,
when both estrogen and testosterone are released from the testes, the body cannot respond to
testosterone, thus leaving the estrogen to feminize the body so that it appears outwardly
female. Id. Those afflicted generally develop female gender identities. Id.; see also
Greenberg, supra note 11, at 278-92 (detailing the range of disorders which give rise to
intersex conditions).
63. S.Y., P. 37 at 57.
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malformed, appeared female, her general physical appearance was female,
and her psychological identification was female.64 With regard to these
features, she was identical to April Ashley.
The Court of Appeal in S.Y., however, found in the wife’s favor.65 Lord
Justice Wilmer noted that consummation only required penetration, not that
intercourse might result in conception.66 Nor was it necessary that either
party experience pleasurable sensations as a result of the connection. The
capacity for penetrative vaginal intercourse might be achieved naturally or
might be assisted medically, where surgery was available to cure a physical
impediment. The onus was on the spouse seeking to nullify the marriage to
prove that the physical defect was incurable by surgery.
Considerable attention was paid to the issue of whether such surgery
should be understood as a cure for a defect or the creation of an artificial
orifice. Lord Justice Wilmer found that the surgery would repair rather
than create a vagina.67 He went on to suggest, however, that the possibility
that he had misinterpreted the medical evidence should have no bearing on
the result:
For myself, I find it difficult to see why the enlargement of a vestigial
vagina should be regarded as producing something different in kind from
a vagina artificially created from nothing. . . . If neither the ability to
conceive nor the degree of sexual satisfaction to be obtained is a
determining factor, what else, it may be asked, remains to differentiate
between intercourse by means of an artificial vagina and intercourse by
means of a natural vagina artificially enlarged? . . . I do not see why
intercourse by means of such a vagina should not be regarded as
amounting to “vera copula,” so as to satisfy the test laid down by Dr.
Lushington.68

Contrast this view with Justice Ormrod’s in Corbett that, “I would, if
necessary, be prepared to hold that the respondent was physically incapable
of consummating a marriage because I do not think that sexual intercourse,
using the completely artificial cavity constructed by Dr. Burou can possibly
be described as . . . vera copula.”69
The sympathetic response to the dilemma of the potentially intersex
spouse in S.Y. is consistent with the approaches that prevailed in the British
medical profession at the turn of twentieth century. The French model
entailed confronting patients who presented as intersex with the truth of
64. Id.
65. Id. at 62.
66. See also Baxter v. Baxter [1948] A.C. 274, 286 (holding that the use of
contraceptives, and thus the prevention of procreation).
67. S.Y., P. 37 at 59.
68. Id. at 59-60.
69. Corbett v. Corbett, [1971] P. 83, 107.
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their misidentification at birth and demanding a rectification of their social
and legal identity.70 British physicians, on the other hand, preferred to find
ways of allowing the patient to continue as a member of their social sex
through surgical intervention. The fact of the patient’s intersex status was
often kept from the patient herself. An 1898 case is illustrative. A widow
presented at Middlesex Hospital complaining of painful swelling in the
groin, which upon examination was identified as a testicle.71 It was
removed and the patient returned to her life believing that she had been
cured of an ordinary rupture.72 The surgeon’s report of the case stated that
he thought it neither necessary nor fair to inform her of her true sex.73
Why were S.Y. and April Ashley treated so differently? It appears that
April Ashley was not recognized as a real woman because the process of
construction of her gender identity was manifest. The wife in S.Y., in
company with other potentially intersex spouses involved in incapacity
cases, was given the benefit of the doubt because her true birth morphology
was hidden. To borrow a term from Judith Butler,74 the facts of Corbett
cause us gender trouble, while those of S.Y. allow us to quiet it.75
Is it important for the law to prevent the experience of cognitive
dissonance some may feel when faced with a person of indeterminate sex?
This seems to be a primary objective of Justice Ormrod’s decision in
Corbett. Unpacking his characterization of April Ashley’s body as “a
pastiche of femininity” provides some guidance as to the nature of the
anxiety the court experienced in contemplating the transsexual. This
anxiety is contained, rather than overcome, by identifying a limited
category of real intersex individuals defined in contrast to the majority of
transsexuals. By explaining the existence of a small group of intersexuals
with reference to their unfortunate pathology, the broader category of
transsexuals is effaced.
Justice Ormrod goes to great lengths to explain that the relationship
between the spouses in Corbett was not akin to a heterosexual marriage
because it was organized around the perverse pleasure of conscious gender
70. ALICE DOMURAT-DREGER, HERMAPHRODITES AND THE MEDICAL INVENTION OF SEX
123 (1998).
71. Id. at 94.
72. Id. at 122.
73. Id. at n.41 (citing Andrew Clark, A Case of Spurious Hermaphroditism, 1 LANCET
718, 719 (Mar. 12, 1898)).
74. See BUTLER, supra note 4, at 17 (explaining that the cultural matrix only allows for
strictly “male” and “female” identities and that, when gender identities fail to conform to the
matrix, they are interpreted as developmental problems or logical impossibilities).
75. See Domurat-Dreger, supra note 57, at 34 (suggesting that the medical protocol for
treating children born with ambiguous genitalia reflects a similar discomfort with bodies
that fail to conform to prevailing norms). Dreger characterizes treatment of intersexuality in
the United States as deeply informed by the idea that such abnormalities are so grotesque
and pathetic that they require immediate normalization. Id.
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transition.76 Arthur Corbett was a transvestite who enjoyed dressing in
women’s clothing but found it unsatisfying because, he is quoted as saying,
“I didn’t like what I saw: you want the fantasy to appear right. It utterly
failed to appear right in my eyes.”77 Indeed, he sought out April because of
her reputation as a female impersonator. Justice Ormrod describes April’s
capacity to achieve a simulacrum of femininity as “the key to the rest of
this essentially pathetic, but almost incredible story.”78
When [Arthur] first saw her he could not believe it. He said he was
mesmerized by her. “[T]his was so much more than I could ever hope to
be. The reality was far greater than my fantasy.” In cross-examination
he put the same thought in these words: “it far outstripped any fantasy
for myself. I could never have contemplated it for myself.”79

Justice Ormrod identifies his own role as vindicating the real against this
fantasy.80 Indeed, he ascribes the breakdown of the marriage to the fact
that, while Arthur “was still in the grip of his fantasies . . . reality had
broken in upon” April and led her to flee the “intolerably false position into
which they had got themselves.”81
It is instructive to parse Justice Ormrod’s characterization of April
Ashley’s gender as a “pastiche.”82 Pastiche has two English meanings.
One refers to a work of art that copies the style of another artist. The other
refers to a medley made up from or imitating various sources.83 In her
book, Gender Trouble, Judith Butler explains why pastiche can be a
disturbing art form: “pastiche disputes the possibility of an ‘original’ or, in
the case of gender, reveals the ‘original’ as a failed effort to ‘copy’ a
phantasmatic ideal that cannot be copied without failure.”84 It is unclear
76. Corbett v. Corbett, [1971] P. 83, 93.
77. Id. at 92.
78. Id. at 92
79. Id.
80. Even if sex reassignment creates the simulacra of a sexual body which reflects
desires rather than some noumenal reality, it is not clear why it is the law’s role to thwart
this desire.
81. Corbett, P. 83 at 94-95.
82. Id. at 104.
83. See RICHARD WAGNER, Judaism in Music, in THE THEATRE: RICHARD WAGNER’S
PROSE WORKS 92 (1894) (accusing Jews of having no authentic cultural identity to express
and of producing inferior artistic work, which was merely a pastiche of others’ styles).
Because he does not have intimate knowledge of German Folk culture to draw upon for
inspiration, “the Jew musician hurl[s] together the diverse forms and styles of every age and
every master.” Id.
84. Compare BUTLER, supra note 4, at 157 n.56 (citing FREDERIC JAMESON,
Postmodernism and Consumer Society, in THE ANTI-AESTHETIC: ESSAYS ON POSTMODERN
CULTURE (Hal Foster, ed.) (1983)), with Bellinger v. Bellinger, [2003] UKHL 21, ¶ 57 (“At
best, what is provided is no more than an imitation of the more obvious parts of that
equipment. Although it is often described as a sex change, the process is inevitably
incomplete. A complete change of sex is, strictly speaking, unachievable.”).
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which definition of pastiche Justice Ormrod had in mind. The different
definitions carry different implications for his conception. Was he merely
stating that Mrs. Corbett had tried but failed to reproduce a copy of natural
femininity? Or did he go further, suggesting that what is so disturbing
about Mrs. Corbett’s aesthetic enterprise is the commingling of male and
female elements in a single individual? I suggest that it was the latter. The
justice’s discomfort was not merely with the fact that Ashley had produced
an inadequate pastiche. Rather, it was by asserting her identity as a
pastiche, an identity which includes elements from both her birth gender
and her chosen gender, that she provoked his anxiety. April’s cultivated
femaleness commingled with her masculine history called into question the
very possibility of essential sexual identities.
Butler’s work is useful for making sense of the English legal system’s
response to transsexuals. Butler notes that feminist theory generally
accepts the idea that gender is not the natural expression of sexual
embodiment but reflects the social meanings attached to sex.85 However,
she argues that feminist theory does not go far enough by simply trying to
effect a disconnection between female bodies and female gender roles.
Rather, we need to understand that the notion of the sexed body is also
produced through discourse.86 It is discourse that constructs this apparent
relationship between pre-discursive sexed bodies and discursively produced
genders. We have no direct pre-social experience of the body; we
understand it through its social meanings as well. The idea that the sexed
body is natural and falls into two distinct and nonoverlapping categories of
male and female is just as socially constructed as the idea that these bodies
manifest their essential natures in appropriate gender roles and forms of
sexual desire.87
In place of this conception of the relationship between sex and gender,
Butler proposes the notion of gender performativity. She argues that both
sexual and gender conceptions are an effect of the repetition of behaviors
through time. The link between sex and gender is effected through the
social reception of these repeated performances, rather than organized by
an underlying substance or essence. For Butler, we learn how to do gender
identities in the same way that we learn how to manipulate a language,
through imitation and gradual command of public cultural idioms. Butler’s
notion of gender as performance is distinct from the fully conscious self
expression of a sovereign liberal subject. Rather, it entails the iteration of
85. BUTLER, supra note 4, at 157 n. 56.
86. See id.
87. See id. at 7 (“As a result, gender is not to culture as sex is to nature; gender is also
the discursive/cultural means by which ‘sexed nature’ or ‘a natural sex’ is produced and
established as ‘prediscursive,’ prior to culture, a politically neutral surface on which culture
acts.” (emphasis in original)).
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norms that precede, constrain, and exceed the performer and are not the
simple expression of her will or choices.88 Within this framework, the
illusion of an essential self who expresses her identity through her actions
is “a fantasy instituted and inscribed on the surface of bodies through our
performances.”89
Butler’s argument provides an analytic tool for identifying the ways in
which the law may operate to ascribe meaning to the bodies of
transsexuals, as well as to their gender roles. It is precisely because
pastiche can have the effect of subverting the fixed binary frame of gender
that the Corbett judgment sought to contain situations in which it occurs.
The binary imagery is not displaced by the transsexual, but its purported
naturalness is undermined.
While the performer of gender cannot escape pre-existing categories, she
may find some imperfectly theorized space in the interstices between
discursive tropes.90 If gender categories are produced through repeated
acts, they can be affected if people engage in counterintuitive and
challenging acts.91 Those who transgress gender norms are particularly
provocative, Butler states, because “the very notion of ‘the person’ is called
into question by the cultural emergence of those ‘incoherent’ or
‘discontinuous’ gendered beings who appear to be persons but who fail to
conform to the gendered norm of cultural intelligibility by which persons
are defined.”92
The presence of transsexual individuals challenges widely held
assumptions about the immutable nature of gender. Popular discourse
ordinarily assumes gender to be obvious, binary, and unchanging and
interprets away inconsistencies in gender presentation. Outside the drag
88. See Moya Lloyd, Performativity, Parody, Politics, 16.2 THEORY, CULTURE AND
SOCIETY 195, 200 (1999) (cautioning against reading Butler as a defender of liberal
autonomy in choosing identities).
89. SUSAN BORDO, UNBEARABLE WEIGHT: FEMINISM, WESTERN CULTURE AND THE
BODY 289-90 (1993).
90. See, e.g., KATE BORNSTEIN, GENDER OUTLAW: ON MEN, WOMEN, AND THE REST OF
US 52 (1994) (stating that transgressive gender identities may not be consciously adopted).
Transsexual commentators take divergent positions on the radicalism of their identities.
Some interpret transsexualism as an indication that gender is inessential and fluid and
capable of being expressed in multiple rather than binary forms. Conversely, some
transsexuals are offended by the suggestion that they are playing with gender norms rather
than seeking to express their essential gender identity. Rather than wishing to see the law
eradicate gender categories to allow a free play of identity, some transsexual individuals
want the law to define their identity, albeit in a manner they deem more accurate.
91. BUTLER, supra note 4, at 124.
92. Id. at 17; see also CAROLE-ANNE TYLER, FEMALE IMPERSONATION 118 (2003)
(noting the feminine’s “uncanny return in impersonation is a fearful reminder that no man is
fully masculine and whole, while the lure of the alternative set of values it represents—
values linked to another way of relating the self to others, to speech, and to desire, according
to feminist theorists like Luce Irigaray—threatens to undermine not only masculinity but
also the patriarchal society it sustains”).
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club, we either ignore the unconventional gender presentation or simply
recategorize the individual in question as a member of the other gender.
There is no in-between.93 Thus, we see in S.Y. v. S.Y. that the ambiguous
message of the wife’s body was ignored and she was characterized as
female.94 Conversely, in Corbett, the ambiguity of the wife’s gender was
made manifest and repudiated. The law found that Ashley was and
remained male.95 The binary gender system remained intact despite her
efforts to blur the categories.96
III. CORBETT IN QUESTION: THE INTERSEX EXCEPTION VS. THE BINARY
RULE
After Corbett, the criteria for determining sex for purposes of English
marriage remained static for over thirty years. In 2001, two cases sought to
revisit the question and, in particular, to explore the implications of
Corbett’s intersex exception. Again, the law showed sympathy to the
spouse whose intersexuality was characterized as an affliction, while
denying recognition to a spouse who appeared to have made a conscious
choice to change sex. The first case to arise, W.v. W., dealt with a spouse
born with indeterminate sexual characteristics but assigned to the male sex
at birth.97 Although raised as male, she developed a female body shape and
female gender identity at puberty.98 In adulthood, she underwent male to
female sex reassignment surgery. The court found that she fell within the
intersex exception in Corbett because there was a natural lack of
congruence among the immutable physical indicia of her sex.99 The court
placed great emphasis on the finding that her initial sex assignment had
been in error and that her transsexual surgery had not changed her sex but

93. See KESSLER & MCKENNA, supra note 62, at 113-14 (concluding that the attitude
that gender is natural is based on certain shared assumptions, such as the following: (1) there
are two and only two genders (male and female); (2) one’s gender is invariant; (3) genitals
are the essential sign of gender; (4) any exceptions to the gender rule are pathological; (5)
there are no transfers between genders except ritual ones; (6) everyone must have a gender;
(7) the male/female dichotomy is a natural one; and (8) membership in one gender or
another is natural rather than ascriptive).
94. See S.Y. v. S.Y., [1962] P. 37.
95. See [1971] P. 83.
96. See JUDITH BUTLER, UNDOING GENDER 218 (2004) (summarizing the psychological
and epistemological impact of such refusal of recognition: “[t]o be called a copy, to be
called unreal, is thus one way in which one can be oppressed. . . . But to be unreal is
something else again. For to be oppressed one must first become intelligible. To find one is
fundamentally unintelligible (indeed, that the laws of culture and of language find one to be
an impossibility) is to find that one has not yet achieved access to the human”).
97. (2001) Fam. 111.
98. Id. at 113.
99. Id. at 146-47.
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correctly assigned her to her natural biological sex.100 Her husband’s
application to have the marriage declared void because the parties were of
the same sex was thus refused.101
The second case, Bellinger v. Bellinger, also involved a male to female
transsexual.102 Mrs. Bellinger was born a physically typical male and
classified as such.103 She was married to a woman at age twenty-one, but
this marriage did not last.104 At the age of twenty-five, she began the
transition to her chosen gender and ultimately underwent full male to
female sex reassignment surgery.105 Some months later, she married Mr.
Bellinger, who was fully aware of her history.106 They remain together
after more than twenty years of marriage.107 Unlike most transsexual
marriage cases, the issue of the validity of this marriage did not arise
because the marriage had broken down. Rather, Mrs. Bellinger sought a
declaration that their subsisting marriage was valid.108 The respondent Mr.
Bellinger filed no objecting reply. It was the Attorney General who elected
to intervene to argue the case against granting the declaration.109
At trial, the lower court applied the Corbett test and found that Mrs.
Bellinger was male because all the immutable physical elements of her
identity—chromosomes, gonads, and genitals—were originally congruent
as male.110 In the Court of Appeal, Mrs. Bellinger sought to expand the
range of factors considered in determining biological sex. She argued that
scientific understanding of the aetiology of sex and gender identity had
changed since the Corbett decision in 1970. Alongside chromosomal,
gonadal and genital factors, courts were now also required to consider the
immutable biological factor of brain structure.111 While the first three
100. Id. at 146; see also FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 11, at 79-80 (noting there is a
movement to postpone surgery on intersex infants until they reach an age where they are
able to express their understanding of their own sexual identity). Proponents of this
approach note that surgery is often performed to soothe the parents of the intersex infant,
rather than for the child’s physical or mental well-being. Id. at 84. They do not propose
raising the child without a gender, but leaving whatever gender choice is made by parents
and doctors a tentative one which can be ratified or repudiated later in life. Id. The affected
child could then choose which, if any, surgical options to pursue. Id.
101. W., Fam. 111 at 146.
102. [2001] EWCA Civ. 1140.
103. Id. at ¶ 3.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. She sought a declaration under the Family Law Act, 1986, c. 55, § 43, Part III,
Declaration of Status (Eng.), that the marriage was valid at its inception.
109. Bellinger, EWCA Civ. 1140 at ¶ 3.
110. Id. at ¶ 4.
111. Id. at ¶¶ 8, 50.
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criteria were congruent in Mrs. Bellinger at birth, she argued that the fourth
factor, brain structure, developed along female lines.112 Her transsexuality,
she argued, reflected the incongruity between her female brain and her
male body. She argued she should therefore be understood as falling
within the intersex exception set out in Corbett.113
In responding to this argument, Madame Justice Butler-Sloss agreed that
new evidence suggests that intersex status may not be capable of ready
perception.114 Some recent postmortem studies comparing the brains of
transsexuals and others show that transsexual men have some elements of
brain structure that are more similar to those of women than to those of
other men.115 It may be that in these cases, while the body has been
configured in one sex, the brain is configured in the other. On this analysis,
some transsexuals may in fact be biologically intersex.
While intrigued by this evidence, Madame Justice Butler-Sloss found
there was no way of determining whether Mrs. Bellinger fell into this
category.116 These gender differentiated brain structures are located in an
area that can only be examined through dissection at autopsy.117 Given the
current capacities for medical investigation, the best that can be said with
regard to a living person, such as Mrs. Bellinger, is that we do not know
what sex her brain is.118 In the absence of such direct evidence, the
advances in general scientific knowledge could not be brought to her aid.
The majority affirmed the relevance of the tri-partite Corbett test and the
result in the court below.119
In dissent, Justice Thorpe urged the abandonment of a purely biological
test.120 Taking into account psychological factors, he would have
recognized Mrs. Bellinger as a woman under English law.121 Thorpe also
went further and called into question the heterosexual conception of
marriage upon which the whole inquiry into sexual identification is
predicated. In doing so, he attempted to reconcile the decisions in Corbett
v. Corbett and S.Y. v. S.Y. He argued that there is no essential difference in
the capacity to consummate a marriage between a transsexual able to have
intercourse and a woman who has had to have surgery in order to become
capable of having intercourse in a body congruent with her
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at ¶ 4.
Id. at ¶ 8.
Id. at ¶¶ 53, 98.
Id. at ¶ 53.
Id. at ¶ 98.
Id., at ¶ 55.
Id. at ¶ 98.
Id. at ¶ 108.
Id. at ¶ 146.
Id. at ¶ 160.
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chromosomes.122 Both have the capacity to consummate as it is defined
under English law.123
The Court of Appeal’s decision in Bellinger was appealed to the House
of Lords.124 Before a decision could be rendered, however, the judgment of
the European Court of Human Rights in Goodwin v. United Kingdom125
and I. v. United Kingdom126 changed the legal background in a significant
fashion.127 Goodwin and I. involved post-operative transsexuals who
claimed that the United Kingdom’s policies on the recognition of gender
transition violated their rights to privacy under Article 8 and to marry and
found a family under Article 12 of the European Convention on Human
Rights.128 The European Court of Human Rights repudiated the Corbett
test, finding that widespread recognition of gender dysphoria as a medical
disorder obviates the need identified by United Kingdom courts to
determine the aetiology of the disorder.129 The European Court found that
122. Id.
123. Id. at ¶ 130. Thorpe thus found that while a union of a man and woman for life
might have been an accurate definition of English marriage at the time of Hyde in 1866, it
no longer held true in a multicultural social context where the import of marriage for the
rights of children and spouses has been much reduced. Id. at ¶ 128. In light of these
changes, he proposed a new gender neutral definition of English marriage as, “a contract for
which the parties elect but which is regulated by the state, both in its formation and in its
termination by divorce, because it affects status upon which depend a variety of
entitlements, benefits and obligations.” Id.
124. [2003] UKHL 21.
125. 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. 447 (2002).
126. 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. 592 (2002).
127. This was not the first time that the European Court of Human Rights had been
asked to review the United Kingdom’s treatment of transsexuals. In the 1986 case of Rees
v. The United Kingdom, the court accepted the government’s argument that the intrusion
into a transsexual’s privacy caused by refusing to alter their legal sex was minimal and was
justified upon public policy grounds. 9 Eur. Ct. H.R. 56, ¶ 51 (1986). The court found that
the United Kingdom did allow transsexuals to adopt a new social gender by allowing them
to change many documents used in ordinary life to reflect their new identity, such as
passports, national insurance cards, and driver’s licenses. Id. at ¶ 19. The court found,
however, that the British birth registry system was not designed to be a record of changing
events but only of states of affairs as they existed at birth. Id. at ¶ 39. To create the capacity
to respond to ongoing developments regarding individual identity by allowing changes of
legal gender would require an expensive overhaul of this system. The margin of
appreciation allowed the UK to decline, on balance, to do so. On the issue of denial of the
right to marry, the court stressed that Article 12 protected only traditional notions of
marriage. Thus, access to the institution could be limited to those capable of achieving its
central purpose, procreation. Id. at ¶ 49; see Cossey v. United Kingdom, 13 Eur. Ct. H.R.
622 (1991); Sheffield v. United Kingdom, 27 Eur. Ct. H.R. 163 (1999) (following Rees with
more emphatic dissents).
128. Goodwin, 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶¶ H3 and H21.
129. Id.; see also DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS §302
(4th ed. 1994); WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL STATISTICAL
CLASSIFICATION OF DISEASES AND RELATED HEALTH PROBLEMS §F64 (2006), http://www.
who.int/classificaitons/apps/icd/icd10online/ (listing Gender Identity Disorder as a
recognized psychiatric disorder).
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the United Kingdom had placed disproportionate emphasis on
chromosomal sex as the basis for legal identification, given that people
with intersex conditions often have gender identities that do not track their
chromosomal sex.130 It cited with approval Justice Thorpe’s dissent in
Bellinger in concluding that chromosomes should not always be the
decisive factor in determining the sex of transsexuals.131
The European Court did not parse this evidence in order to identify an
ideal definition of gender transition for the purposes of marriage.132 It did,
however, state that it was incumbent on some instrumentality of the British
state, be it the judiciary or the legislature, to produce a workable definition
and to allow those who meet it to marry in their new sex.133 The court
concluded that the United Kingdom’s policy regarding the recognition of
gender transition violates Articles 8 and 12 of the European Convention on
Human Rights and is not justified by any public policy concerns.134
In December 2002, the government announced that it intended to bring
forth legislation that would permit transsexuals to change their legal gender
and to marry in their new gender.135 Most significantly, counsel for the
government in the Bellinger appeal conceded that since delivery of the
Goodwin decision, English laws that failed to recognize gender transitions
were in principle incompatible with Articles 8 and 12 of the European
Convention on Human Rights.136
It was in this very changed and charged context that the House of Lords
considered the Bellinger appeal. The House of Lords rendered a
unanimous set of reasons declaring Section 11(c) of the Matrimonial
Causes Act incompatible with the Convention, triggering the “fast track”
procedures under Section 10 of the Human Rights Act of 1998 for
amendment of offending legislation, but declining to offer an alternative
definition of gender for purposes of marriage.137

130. Goodwin, 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 82.
131. Id. at ¶¶ 81-82.
132. Id.
133. Id. at ¶¶ 102-04.
134. Id. at ¶ 124.
135. Press Release, Rosie Winterton MP, Government Announcement on Transsexual
People (Dec. 13, 2002), http://www.dca.gov.uk/constitution/transsex/statement.htm.
136. [2003] UKHL 21.
137. Goodwin has also led to re-evaluation of eligibility for spousal survivors’ pensions
to which transsexual couples would have been entitled had they been allowed to marry in
their new sex. See Case C-117/01, K.B. v. Nat’l Health Serv. Pensions Agency, 2004
E.C.R. I-541.
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IV. THE GENDER RECOGNITION ACT OF 2004: GENDER TROUBLE IN A NEW
GUISE
Parliament’s response was not to abolish the gender criteria for marital
validity but to design a mechanism that would allow transsexuals to
exercise their right to marry by allowing them to find a place in the
heterosexual marriage paradigm. The Gender Recognition Act of 2004
seeks to get the courts out of the business of defining gender by granting
the authority to make those determinations to a panel of medico-legal
experts.138 These Gender Recognition Panels are empowered to investigate
claims of gender transition. The panel receives letters from the applicant’s
doctors139 attesting that the applicant has or has had gender dysphoria,140
that the applicant has lived in the acquired gender throughout the preceding
two years, and that the applicant intends to continue to live in the acquired
gender until death.141 These criteria having been met, in most cases, the
panel will immediately grant a gender recognition certificate, which allows
the recipient’s legal gender to be altered.142 While the Act is a huge step
forward, it raises certain troubling issues.
A. Gender Transition is Not Permitted Where it Would Transform a
Heterosexual Marriage Into a Same-Sex Marriage
While the Gender Recognition regime was being prepared, Parliament
was also developing legislation aimed at offering marriage-like benefits to
same-sex couples. The Civil Partnership Act of 2004 is meant to work in
tandem with the Gender Recognition Act, providing a form of status for
married couples whose marriages are rendered invalid by the gender
transition of one of the parties. The option of collapsing the distinction
between heterosexual marriage and homosexual relationships was rejected
in favor of this more complex scheme.
In a presentation to the Parliamentary Working Group examining
138. See Gender Recognition Act, 2004, c. 7, sched. 1 (U.K.) (providing that the panels
will meet in private, must determine the application without a hearing unless they deem one
necessary, and must give reasons for their decision).
139. Gender Recognition Act § 3(1) (U.K.).
140. The reference to past affliction assures the inclusion of those whose dysphoria has
been alleviated by gender reassignment surgery or other treatment. The Act does not require
evidence of completed gender reassignment surgery.
141. Gender Recognition Act §2(1) (U.K.).
142. See Gender Recognition Act §§4(2), 4(3) (U.K.) (establishing that the only
exception to this regime will be situations in which the applicant is already party to a
marriage or a civil partnership). In such cases, the panel is only able to issue an interim
gender recognition certificate. § 4(3). This renders the marriage or partnership voidable for
a period of six months. Sched. 2. Only if the relationship is dissolved through annulment,
death, or divorce can the interim certificate be converted into a full one. § 5(a).
Transsexual spouses will thus face a choice between recognition of their sexual identities
and recognition of their existing intimate legal relationships. Id.; see also Civil Partnerships
Act, 2004, c. 33, §250 (Eng. and Wales) (adding § 5(a) to the Gender Recognition Act).
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transsexual issues, the leading transsexual advocacy group, Press for
Change, called for the opening of the institution of marriage to all,
regardless of the perceived or actual sex of the partners.143 It pointed out
that a significant proportion of transsexuals would still be excluded from
marriage after passage of the Gender Recognition Act because they
identified as homosexual in their new gender.144 They also sought to
minimize the implications that the Gender Recognition Act might have on
same sex marriage more widely. In arguing that gender recognition should
not render an existing marriage invalid, they stated:
[M]arriages already contracted for a certain time (e.g.[,] five years) at the
time of the legislation coming into force could be exempted from the
requirement to be dissolved. Normal attrition then means that the
number of such marriages would diminish over time, and there would be
less ability to try and draw parallels between this exception of trans
couples remaining married and same sex couples wanting to marry.145

While the Gender Recognition Act allows individuals to change their
sex, it does not change the essential heterosexuality of English marriage.146
An applicant under the Gender Recognition Act must include a statutory
declaration stating whether s/he is married at the time of the application.147
If the applicant is unmarried, the panel will issue a full gender recognition
certificate.148 If, however, the applicant is married at the time the
application is granted, the panel may only issue an interim gender
recognition certificate.149 Only a full gender recognition certificate will
entitle the individual to claim his acquired legal identity by being entered in
the Gender Recognition Register and securing amendment of her/his birth
certificate to reflect the acquired gender.150 Since it began operation, the
Gender Recognition Panel has issued thirty-eight interim recognition
certificates and 1,307 full recognition certificates.151
143. See HOME OFFICE REPORT, supra note 3, at 35 (“The work done in society by longterm partnerships within all sexualities, whether in caring for subsequent or previous
generations, or facilitating each other’s careers and the socially valuable work those careers
entail, is so important that the commitment of all sorts of couples should be equally valued
and recognised.”).
144. Id. at 36.
145. PRESS FOR CHANGE, SUBMISSION TO THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS
REGARDING THE DRAFT GENDER RECOGNITION BILL 13 (2003) (emphasis in original).
146. The Marriage Act, 1949 is amended to ensure that the prohibitions on marriage
within the boundaries of affinity and consanguinity are extended to the acquired sex. Thus a
male to female transsexual becomes prohibited from marrying her new husband’s close
male relatives. See The Marriage Act, sched. 4. s. 2 (U.K.).
147. Gender Recognition Act §3(6)(a) (U.K.).
148. § 4(2).
149. § 4(3).
150. § 3(3).
151. E-mail from Catherine Dyer, Gender Recognition Secretariat, to Dr. Lisa Fishbayn
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Schedule 2 of the Gender Recognition Act amends the Matrimonial
Causes Act of 1973 to provide that the issuance of an interim gender
recognition certificate renders a subsisting marriage voidable by either
party for a period of six months.152 At this point, three things might
happen:
(1) If the marriage has been annulled on the basis of the interim
gender recognition certificate, the court that makes the nullity
decree absolute must issue a full gender recognition certificate
to the effected party.153
(2) If, during that six-month period, the marriage has otherwise
been terminated by divorce or the death of one of the parties,
the applicant may apply to a Gender Recognition Panel to
have his/her interim gender recognition certificate converted
into a full gender recognition certificate. This application
must be granted upon the production of proof that the
applicant is now unmarried.
(3) If no nullity action has been brought within six months of the
issuance of the interim gender recognition certificate, further
applications to void the marriage are barred and the marriage
remains valid.154 Without the dissolution of this marriage,
however, it will not be possible for the individual to convert
his interim gender recognition into a full recognition
certificate.
Thus, those transsexuals who are currently legally married in their birth sex
face a choice. They may secure recognition of their new gender identity
but only at the price of dissolving their marriages. They may, conversely,
preserve their marriages but will then be unable to fully assume their new
gender identity. The same conundrum will face parties to a civil
partnership who wish to change their legal sex but remain legally

(June 6, 2006) (on file with author).
152. See Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973, c. 18, § 2(2) (U.K.) (amending the Act to
provide that a marriage will be voidable if the respondent’s gender at the time of marriage
was acquired under the Gender Recognition Act). Resort to this and other voidable grounds
for annulment remain limited to situations in which action has been brought within 3 years
of the date of marriage and has not been condoned by the applicant seeking the declaration.
§ 13. The acquisition of a new gender is added to the limited category of grounds for nullity
which can only be relied on if the applicant demonstrates that s/he was ignorant of this fact
at the time of marriage. § 11(c).
153. Gender Recognition Act § 5 (U.K.).
154. Gender Recognition Act § 3 (U.K.).
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connected to their current partner.155
In its submissions on the Act, Press for Change argued for a generous
attitude toward these couples, noting that the effect of the law will punish
those who have supported their transsexual spouse through a gender
transition by denying them the psychological and financial benefits of the
recognition of this relationship.156 The government’s Interdepartmental
Working Group on Transsexual People acknowledged that “no purpose will
be served by insisting that a couple should divorce in order for the
transsexual partner’s acquired gender to be recognised”.157 It concluded,
however, that “it would be very difficult to allow same-sex marriages in
this context but no other.”158
The Civil Partnership Act of 2004 allows same-sex couples to register
the commencement of their relationships and to dissolve them in
accordance with legal norms which are largely identical to those applied to
marriage.159 Couples compelled to divorce under the Gender Recognition
Act will be able to immediately enter into civil partnership under the Civil
Partnership Act.160 It does not appear that any mechanism exists to ensure
that the marriage and the partnership will be treated as one continuous
union for purposes of marriage-linked entitlements. Moreover, the nontranssexual spouse may not identify as homosexual and may not wish to
enter into a civil partnership, which redefines their relationship as such.161
155. See Gender Recognition Act, 2004, c. 7, § 5(2) (U.K.).
156. See PRESS FOR CHANGE, supra note 145, at 10-14, app. 3.
157. HOME OFFICE REPORT, supra note 3, at 22.
158. Id.
159. The partnership can only be dissolved on terms that echo the heterosexual regime,
with one key exception: the Civil Partnership Act contains no reference to adultery as a
ground for dissolution, as adultery is defined only as heterosexual infidelity. See Civil
Partnership Act, 2004, c. 33, § 44. A partner may invoke homosexual affairs to end the
relationship, but only as a form of intolerable behavior. § 44. The explanatory notes to the
Civil Partnerships Bill state that civil partnership offers the same status, rights and
obligations as marriage. Stonewall, the leading gay rights advocacy group in the United
Kingdom, agrees with this designation: “With civil partnerships you get every right and
every privilege—and every responsibility—straight couples get when they marry. It’s the
same thing. You can even ask your relations for toasters.” STONEWALL, supra, at 4
(emphasis in original). It has been greeted in the media as tantamount to civil marriage as
well. See Alan Cowell, Gay Britons Signing Up As Unions Become Legal, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 6, 2005, at A12.
160. Civil Partnership Act, 2004, 33, § 96 (Eng. and Wales) (allowing for an expedited
application procedure for registration within 30 days of application for those whose
marriages were dissolved through a Gender Recognition Act process).
161. PRESS FOR CHANGE, supra note 145, at 13-14 (“[M]any such relationships survive
simply by sidestepping the question of orientation altogether. It is simply not relevant to the
relationship—only to a prurient society. It may therefore be an unpalatable ‘step too far’ to
expect the partner to be content with labeling themselves as something they are not—simply
to meet the needs of political expediency on the part of a Government which thinks it has
found a neat way of keeping the same sex partnership and marriage questions artificially
separate.”).
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B. Applicants May Have to Shape Their Gender Narratives to Suit the
Agenda of Medical Experts
Of the estimated 5,000 eligible transsexuals in the United Kingdom,
1,515 have made applications for recognition under the Act.162 Early
evidence regarding the operation of the Act suggests that most applicants
are successful.163 The high rate of success may reflect the willingness of
the tribunal to accommodate applicants and a process of self-selection on
the part of applicants. Married applicants may be ambivalent about coming
forward. Others may resent having to provide medical evidence to support
a gender transition that they view as a political or aesthetic choice.164
Medical conceptions of transsexualism are mutable and inflected by
gender ideology. It is instructive to set the invocation of medical
knowledge in Corbett and in the Gender Recognition Act in historical
context. Medical practitioners have long been the gatekeepers to legal
gender recognition. Medicine has played a role in interpreting the bodies
of intersexual and transsexual people and has offered shifting accounts of
their meaning. In a nineteenth century society in which inheritance rights,
proprietary capacity, eligibility for military service, voting rights, and
contractual competence were linked to sex, it was important to establish
whether an individual had the physical qualifications for male legal
personality.165 The need to identify and regulate the rights of individuals
meant that the notion of a person who was both a male full legal subject
and a female subject of limited legal capacity was unacceptable. The role
of doctors in this context was not provision of a neutral descriptive account
of hermaphrodites’ bodies but “deciphering the true sex that was hidden
beneath ambiguous appearances.”166
1. Defining Sex
The shifting criteria for determining sex have reflected the gender
ideology of the time. The distinction between biological sex and social
162. E-mail from Catherine Dyer, supra note 151 (noting that thirty-one applications
have been refused, twenty-four have been withdrawn without a decision, and thirty-eight
have received interim recognition certificates).
163. See id; see also Claire McNab, UK: Gender Recognition Statistics, UKPFC NEWS
Archives, July 16, 2005.
164. See PRESS FOR CHANGE, supra note 145, at 23.
165. See FAUSTO-STERLING, supra, note 11, at 40; see also Bellinger v. Bellinger, [2001]
EWCA Civ. 1140, ¶ 27 (agreeing that “[t]he social and legal systems have left no room for
intersexed subjects”); Forbes-Semphill v. Forbes-Semphill (1967) unreported, Scottish
Court of Administration, cited in WHITTLE, supra note 11, at 135 (discussing an exceptional
case in which a Scottish lady born Elizabeth Forbes-Sempill was granted a warrant for birth
re-registration as a male in the early 1950s). He later changed his name to Ewan ForbesSempill, married, and inherited his father’s title upon his death. Id.
166. MICHAEL FOUCAULT, HERCULINE BARBIN: BEING THE RECENTLY DISCOVERED
MEMOIRS OF A NINETEENTH CENTURY FRENCH HERMAPHRODITE viii (1980).
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gender was not drawn by Victorian medical practitioners. Accordingly,
personal qualities such as aggressiveness/bravery and passivity/modesty
were read as indicia of sexual identity.167 Early twentieth century guidance
of how to identify true gender looked to stereotyped personal qualities: a
child with high IQ and career ambitions was boyish; one with lower IQ and
few career ambitions more likely a girl.168
Such stereotyping may continue to play a role in some conceptions of
appropriate therapy for transsexual patients. Doctors may require as part of
167. See DOMURAT-DREGER, supra note 70, at 89-90. Social norms that characterize
males as active and females as passive are also reflected in the interpretation of biological
information in reproductive biology. Theories of fetal sexual development see fetuses as
naturally female unless actively androgenized by male hormones. See Greenberg, supra note
11. While both androgen (a male hormone) and estrogen (a female hormone) are shown to
have a masculinizing effect on fetuses, many biologists describe estrogen as mimicking the
effect of androgen. See FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 11, at 155. Androgen is understood to
be an active agent of change; to the extent a hormone associated with femininity also has
this capacity, it is understood as mimicking maleness. MARIANNE VAN DEN WIJNGAARD,
REINVENTING THE SEXES: THE BIOMEDICAL CONSTRUCTION OF FEMININITY AND
MASCULINITY 49 (1997). Current research calls into question whether even the existence of
somatic differences between the sexes, or between intersex individuals and others, should be
seen as the causes or as the effects of gender difference. Id. For example, it may be that
areas of the brain develop or atrophy in light of the experience of living in accordance with
the norms of one’s gender. Id. Somatic changes may be the result of behaviors as well as
being their cause. Id. at 240. She points to the example of string musicians and the blind
braille users. Id. Both have areas of the brain linked to finger usage which are more
extensive than those used by people without these abilities. Id. For example, while
increased levels of testosterone correlate with increased levels of aggression, the path of
causation is not clear. Id. Comparatively greater aggression in men may result from the
presence of testosterone in their bodies, but it may also be that acting aggressively causes
increased production of testosterone. Id.; see also KESSLER & MCKENNA, supra note 62, at
60 (hypothesizing that men may have more testosterone in their systems because social
norms permit them to engage in more aggressive behavior).
168. See VAN DEN WIJNGAARD, supra note 167, at 32 (“These investigations reproduced
the social image of masculinity (and males) and associated masculinity with active behavior,
career, and intelligence, whereas femininity (and female behavior) was associated with
passivity, motherhood, and a lower intelligence level than males. At the same time, the
investigations based on the organization theory produced or constructed an image of a
biological background that formed the basis for masculinity and femininity and was
attributed to the result of hormonal action on the fetal brain.” (emphasis in original)).
Gender ideology of the active male and passive female also shapes conceptions of
appropriate treatment for children born with intersex conditions. Id.; see also DOMURATDREGER, supra note 70, at 27 (describing as troubling the asymmetric ways in which these
protocols treat femininity and masculinity). Newborn genetic females, defined as those with
no Y chromosomes, are always assigned to the female gender, while genetic males remain
male only if they are endowed with an “adequate” penis. Id. An “adequate penis” is 2.5
centimetres when stretched at birth. Id. A functional penis is one which looks normal, can
pass urine and semen and can achieve erections. Id. A functional vagina, whether natural
or created through vaginoplasty need not have any sensation, lead anywhere, or be selflubricating. Id. It only needs to be large enough to passively receive a normal erect penis.
Id.; see also SHARON E. PREVES, INTERSEX AND IDENTITY 78 (2003) (asserting that the
messages conveyed throughout childhood to intersexuals often lead to further confusion in
that they are told they are “normal” yet require a little surgical “fixing up” anyway). See
generally SUZANNE KESSLER, LESSONS FROM THE INTERSEXED (1990) (arguing that the
unusual genitalia of intersexuals could be considered to be intact rather than deformed).
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the diagnosis of gender dysphoria that the patient see himself in
stereotypical gender terms and reject those who have an idiosyncratic
interpretation of gender. Claire McNabb describes her experience with
gender psychiatrists as one in which the progress of transsexual women,
such as herself, was evaluated by assessing the quality of their manicure,
cosmetic usage, attire, and employment in gender stereotyped jobs.169
Doctors may also insist that the patient identify as heterosexual in their new
gender and reject those who envision themselves as transgendered and
homosexual.170
By winnowing out those candidates for transition who define their
gender identity in idiosyncratic ways and rewarding those who are inclined
to inhabit their new gender role according to stereotypes, doctors may
actually determine what a legitimate narrative of transsexual identity is.171
Those seeking treatment have little choice but to play the system by
offering narratives which fit these criteria in order to achieve their
objectives. Indeed, Judith Butler urges transsexuals to manipulate medical
practitioners in this way because securing a diagnosis of gender dysphoria
may be a necessary step in expressing their autonomy to redefine their
gender.172
The very need to inquire into the meaning of gender transition itself
reflects a concern with the maintenance of gender hierarchy. The anxiety
about the definition of gender and gender transition suggests the extreme
importance of gender as a category of social organization.173 Marjorie
Garber asks why, for example, we accept that someone like the singer Cher
who undergoes multiple cosmetic surgeries retains her identity, while
someone who has their genitalia altered has dramatically repudiated their
birth identity.174 The answer lies in a deep-seated sense that women should
not be passing as men because they would be usurping power to which they
169. Claire McNab, Press for Change, The Devil’s Dictionary of Trans Terminology
(Dec. 1998), http:// www. pfc.org.uk/node/594/print (speculating that many non-transsexual
women would fail this arbitrary test for gender categorization).
170. FAUSTO-STERLING, supra, note 11, at102.
171. See, e.g., Susan Etta Keller, Crisis of Authority: Medical Rhetoric and Transsexual
Identity, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 51, 53 (1999) (deploring the rhetorical construction of
identity by medical professionals because the stereotypes that accompany transsexual
surgery substitute for more thoroughgoing challenges to gender norms).
172. See, e.g., BUTLER, supra note 4, at 76 (describing the tension between conceiving
gender transition as an expression of personal autonomy and needing to shape the narrative
of transition in ways acceptable to medical experts).
173. See Greenberg, supra note 11, at 293.
174. MARJORIE GARBER, VESTED INTERESTS: CROSS-DRESSING AND THE CULTURAL
ANXIETY 185 (1992). An anxiety may be observed where an individual’s self-presentation
does not cohere with accepted racial stereotypes. Popular anxiety about Jackson’s
transformation of his African American features into ones which resemble those of a
European similarly suggest discomfort with physical transformations which seek to hide or
transcend physical differences which underpin social hierarchy.
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are not entitled and men should not be passing as women because they are
thereby surrendering privileges of which they should not lightly dispose.
Surgical alteration of both primary and secondary sex characteristics are
viewed as fraught with meaning that does not attach to the surgical
alteration of other body parts.
2. Defining Therapeutic Surgery
The need to characterize transsexuality as pathology rather than as a
chosen mode of existence may also reflect the needs of the medical
profession itself. Since the development of techniques for plastic surgery
in the eighteenth century, they have been used to alleviate the social and
emotional impact of certain bodily configurations. This new discipline
claimed that it performed a therapeutic function, rather than a merely
aesthetic one. Medical historian Sander Gilman notes that plastic surgery
has been treated as politically and morally suspect precisely because it has
been deployed to enable people to hide their true identities.175 Aesthetic
surgery has been used to repair the injuries of war, to hide the ravages of
congenital syphilis, and to mask ethnic identity (for example, by allowing
Jews to pass as non-Jews). It now allows those afflicted by a sense of
unhappiness with their sexed bodies to choose a body which better
comports with their gender identity. In all these situations, the discipline of
plastic surgery has sought to justify its intervention as meeting a genuine
medical need rather than as a form of complicity in a dysfunctional act of
self-deception or self-mutilation.176 The acceptance of gender dysphoria as
a therapeutic diagnosis is key to this conception of legitimacy. An
alternative conception of gender transition as an autonomous act of selfcreation does not fit easily within this paradigm.
Even with these flaws, the Gender Recognition Act is a major reform
that offers longed for recognition to most transsexuals.177 The Corbett
criteria have been supplanted by a process which delegates the power to
determine gender transition to a panel of medico-legal experts. While this
structure will facilitate the adaptation of gender criteria to changing
standards of medical knowledge, it leaves open the possibility that
175. SANDER L. GILMAN, MAKING THE BODY BEAUTIFUL: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF
AESTHETIC SURGERY xxi (1999).
176. A plastic surgeon commenting on an earlier draft of this paper expressed
ambivalence about becoming involved in transgender surgery for just this reason. He found
it hard to distinguish gender dsyphoria from body dysmorphic disorder, viewing both as
forms of mental illness which focused anxiety on some part of the body. He believed that
they required psychiatric rather than surgical treatment. In body dysmorphic disorder, a
patient expresses a strong desire to have a limb removed. Most physicians refuse to comply
with such desires, but one Scottish doctor has performed several such amputations. See
Surgeon Defends Amputations, BBC NEWS, Jan. 31 2000, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/Scotland/625680.stm.
177. Gender Recognition Act, 2004, c. 7, § 1 (U.K.).
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ideologies of gender will continue to play a role in determining what
constitutes an acceptable narrative of gender transition. While the Gender
Recognition Act regime is a step forward, it is merely a transformation of
the way in which English law pathologizes transsexuals, not an affirmation
that gender transition may be a legitimate way of structuring one’s personal
identity.
The Gender Recognition Act does not read gender transition as giving
effect to an individual’s desire to challenge or move beyond stable gender
categories, but as a therapeutic response to their misfortune in failing to fit
the binary gender system.178 The result performs the neat trick of
recognizing the reality of transsexual embodiment but strictly confining the
significance of this recognition. Transsexuals are not seen as troubling
gender outlaws, the natural allies of same sex couples in seeking to break
down the essentialist links between sex, gender, and marriage. Rather, they
are seen as gender refugees, being offered an end to their exile from their
true home in the heterosexual binary paradigm.

178. See Susan Etta Keller, Operations of Legal Rhetoric: Examining Transsexual and
Judicial Identity, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 329, 336-37 (1999) (relying on Butler to
argue that legal rhetoric in cases involving transsexuals reproduces transsexual identity as
abject).
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